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Letter: Letter: Popper defined

Published 1 September 1990

From FIROZ MOHAMED

E. Paull’s fears about the implications for epistemology of falsifying
Popper’s principle are groundless because Popper has never claimed to provide
a hypothesis which helps to distinguish between sense and nonsense (Letters,
18 August). His criterion of falsifiability, which states that a hypothesis
is scientific if it is falsifiable, unscientific of it is not, merely draws
an essentially arbitrary but very useful line of demarcation between science
and non-science. Popper’s principle is thus a definition of science, not
a hypothesis about it. Therefore, it is invalid to subject it to the criterion
of falsifiability, which only applies to hypotheses.

Firoz Mohamed Glossop, Derbyshire

Issue no. 1732 published 1 September 1990

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