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Letter: Tapping the Net

Published 7 October 2000

From Charles Clarke, Home Office

The complete hands-off approach to Net security that you advocate in your Editorial of 17 June
(p 3)
is not an option for this government or any other. It
cannot be right for criminals to abuse new communications technologies with
impunity because existing statutory powers are deficient. We recognise that in
updating the law in this area, we have a responsibility to weigh up issues of
individual rights, the interests of business and of those charged with keeping
society safe from crime. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill—which
received the Royal Assent on 28 July and is now the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)—is a reflection of this.

You castigate the government for being supposedly ignorant of technological
developments. I do not accept this. We know that the spread of the Internet
means that governments and law enforcement agencies are operating in a
technological environment wholly different from what has gone on before. RIPA is
not about controlling the Internet. It is all about helping to ensure that vital
law enforcement powers are not undermined critically as a result of rising
criminal use of new technologies.

RIPA has given rise to a number of myths. You assert, as fact, that it
“forces all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to install connections to the
security services”. This is wrong—the act does no such thing. As we have
explained, a fraction of ISPs may be required to maintain an intercept
capability. But the act ensures that this can only happen after consultation
with individual ISPs on the precise terms of that requirement. We are discussing
these with the relevant players across the industry.

We have set aside £20 million over three years from April 2001 to ease
the introduction of the new arrangements. And RIPA provides for the
establishment of a Technical Advisory Board, comprising a balance of government
and industry members, to oversee notices served on communications service
providers requiring the maintenance of an intercept capability.

We recognise, though, that laws are not enough. Your Editorial and a later news article
(29 July, p 4)
imply that we believe they are. But you ignore the
wider picture. We are aware of the technical challenges put forward by some
commentators on RIPA, and others besides. We have never pretended that the act
represents the answer to all law enforcement’s problems.

The harsh reality, which we have accepted, is that rising criminal use of new
technologies means that law enforcement is going to take a hit. We recognise
that there are no simple answers. That is why we have proposed a package of
measures to help, including the provision of £25 million to establish a
dedicated technical resource and, crucially, a recognition of the need to forge
a greater cooperative relationship with industry.

RIPA is an important measure. We take seriously our responsibility of
ensuring that Britain remains a safe place for everyone to live and work in.

London

Issue no. 2259 published 7 October 2000

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