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Letter: Conscious at a guess

Published 28 January 2015

From Chris Britton

Ian Beaver’s argument that machines could be considered conscious rests on the axiom that humans “are themselves calculating machines” (17 January, p 54). But humans are definitely not calculating machines.

When you catch a ball you do not calculate its trajectory; you guess it. When the ball is nearer, you guess again, hopefully better this time. Whenever you see, you have layers of guesses; you guess boundaries, guess shapes and guess objects.

Humans are guessing machines, not calculating machines. It makes a huge difference. Calculations are fragile – a slight change and the answer is completely different. Guesses are robust, can be learned, don’t require a software-hardware dichotomy and can be subject to evolution.

In the 18th century, they thought clockwork was a good model for humans. Now we think computers are. Wrong again.
Twickenham, UK

Issue no. 3006 published 31 January 2015

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